By unilaterally and unlawfully recognising the secessionist region of Somaliland, Tel Aviv has effectively established a strategic presence near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, positioning itself close to the Houthi movement in Yemen. The latter has persistently targeted Israel with drones and missiles and threatened Red Sea shipping during the two years of the war on Gaza.
This step, widely rejected and condemned at international, Arab and African levels, marked the culmination of a prolonged and discreet process of coordination between Tel Aviv and Hargeisa. Through it, the Israeli prime minister became the first leader of a UN member state to recognise Somaliland more than thirty years after its split from Mogadishu. Israel regards the move as both a diplomatic gain and a significant security advance, strengthening its footprint in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
Somaliland’s strategic value lies in its location at the junction of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa. It hosts the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, along with a nearby airport featuring one of Africa’s longest runways, giving the territory oversight of a vital global maritime corridor.
According to The Wall Street Journal, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the accompanying intelligence-sharing and maritime security arrangements are intended to extend its diplomatic reach after two years of conflict and to curb Iran’s influence in Yemen by limiting Houthi threats to navigation. While Washington has not formally endorsed the agreement, it has not opposed Israel’s expanding role.
Israeli media reports indicate that the deal relied heavily on Emirati backing, given Abu Dhabi’s close relations with Somaliland’s leadership. Notably, the UAE was the only Arab state that refrained from condemning the recognition, prompting questions about its involvement amid overlapping interests in a highly sensitive geopolitical arena.
The UAE’s engagement in Somalia dates back to the early 1990s, when it participated in UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions amid prolonged civil war. Its role later expanded through involvement in the Puntland Maritime Police Force, in a region itself at odds with Mogadishu, and through financial and security support aimed at countering the militant group al-Shabaab, with Emirati forces at times drawn into local political disputes.
A decisive shift occurred in 2016, when Abu Dhabi signed an agreement with Somaliland granting it a 30-year lease to establish a base at Berbera airport, less than 300 kilometres from Yemen. Berbera, the region’s main port and commercial centre, has long been regarded as one of the Horn of Africa’s most strategic harbours, attracting growing international attention since Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991.
The UAE’s focus on Hargeisa intensified after it failed to secure a durable partnership with Somalia’s internationally recognised government in Mogadishu, which enjoys strong backing from Turkey and Qatar. Following a defence agreement that expanded Ankara’s role in supporting the Somali army and navy and monitoring the coastline, Abu Dhabi scaled back its involvement, leaving Somaliland as its principal avenue for maintaining influence in the Gulf of Aden.
Abu Dhabi also played a key role in strengthening ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland, facilitating an agreement allowing Addis Ababa to operate Berbera port, which the UAE had developed for commercial and military use. This arrangement drew opposition from Egypt and Turkey, as it grants landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea.
Although the UAE does not formally recognise Somaliland, it exercises substantial influence through close relations with its leadership. This was underscored by its hosting of Somaliland’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi Iro, at the 2025 World Government Summit, where he praised DP World’s role in transforming Berbera into a regional logistics hub.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is closely connected to Emirati actions in Yemen, where Abu Dhabi backs the Southern Transitional Council’s bid to control southern coastal and resource-rich areas. This dynamic effectively places the Houthis between Emirati-supported forces in the south and Israeli influence across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Translated by Mostafa Hassan
